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Abstract 
 This study addresses the need for a parsimonious theoretical model to explain 
state-corporate crime.  The Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime will 
be compared to the Integrated Theory of International Criminal Law Violation to 
determine which model provides the most accurate theoretical depiction of state-
corporate crime, while retaining parsimony.  For this comparison, the models will be 
applied to Democratic Republic of Congo case study.  Using a secondary analysis of 
qualitative data and preexisting literature, it was found that the Integrated Theoretical 
Model of State-Corporate Crime displays a representative depiction of all state-corporate 
crime actors and their catalysts for action in a more parsimonious manner than the 
Integrated Theory of International Criminal Law Violation. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
State-corporate crime has far reaching consequences that not only result in the 
harm to individuals, but in harm to society.  When state-corporate crime occurs, relatively 
little attention and resources are given to them in relation to the large-scale impact of the 
crime.  Criminal actions by governments and corporations reverberate across society.  
The concept of state-corporate crime has existed for years, but for the degree of damage 
that occurs, little research has been conducted in the field of criminology. To help in 
addressing this problem, I will be reviewing recent history and current events in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  Attention given to these series of conflicts has 
not been proportionate to the loss of human life; estimates of casualties from the 
Congolese conflicts, for example, are as high as 3.8 million from 1998 to 2004 (Turner, 
2007).  In comparison, the twenty years of the Vietnam war produced about 1.9 million 
military and civilian deaths, while the three year Korean War produced 1.2 million 
military deaths for North and South Koreans, the Chinese and the United States (Lacina, 
& Gleditsch, 2005). 
The DRC has had a tumultuous history.  Exploitation of the country’s people and 
mineral resources has occurred for years against a backdrop of political corruption and 
ethnic tensions, resulting in genocide and inter-state conflict.  In the context of state-
corporate crime, little theory has been applied to these particular circumstances, with the 
exception of a brief contribution to the criminological literature by Mullins and Rothe 
(2008).  The theoretical contributions to state-corporate crime as a whole have also been 
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sadly lacking in the criminological field.  To address the issue of specific DRC coverage 
and theoretical application to state-corporate crime in general, I will be using the 
Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime (Model I), which was initially 
developed by Kramer and Michalowski (as cited by Kramer, Michalowski, & Kauzlarich, 
2002) to review three levels of analysis: institutional environment, organizational, and 
interaction.  Each level of the theory breaks down the motivations, opportunities, and 
operationality of controls faced by the government, corporations, and individuals 
responsible for the crime.   I will then compare this model to the Integrated Theory of 
International Criminal Law Violation (Model II), which was founded on Model I, and is 
used to explain the DRC conflict by Mullins and Rothe (2008).  This theoretical 
application by Mullins and Rothe (2008) displays Model II’s lack of parsimony; the 
model is unnecessarily complicated, as seen when I compare it to the application of 
Model I. 
This work is a secondary analysis of qualitative data collected using case study 
methods.  Consequently, to ensure ideal standards are met, I will be using Yin’s case 
study research design components.  These components include, “a study’s questions; its 
propositions, if any; its unit(s) of analysis; the logic linking the data to the propositions; 
and the criteria for interpreting the findings” (Yin, 1994, p.20).  This case study seeks to  
determine the relative contribution of Model II in comparison to Model I within the 
specific occurrence of state-corporate crime in the DRC.  The comparative parsimony of 
the Model I provides a similar degree of theoretical support in explaining state-corporate 
crime in the DRC when compared to Model II.  These results indicate that Model I 
should be preferred over Model II on the grounds of parsimony of explanation, and that 
3 
Model I is likely sufficient for purposes of research in the field of state-corporate crime.  
The unit of analysis is considered the entire scope of the DRC conflict, which could be 
demarcated by the beginning of the Second Congo War and the ensuring civil and 
regional fighting.  The most explicit documentation in relation to state-corporate crime 
comes from the Human Rights Watch (2005) and the United Nations Security Council 
(2003).  Linking data to the theoretical propositions of Model I and Model II includes 
connecting collected data to the scope and propositions found in each theory.  In this 
study, this issue is specifically examined in the application of the models to the DRC 
conflict in Chapter Six.  Similarly, the criteria for interpreting findings include the 
description of the models and their subcategories and subsequent application in Chapters 
Four and Six. 
The recent history of the DRC is a myriad of shifting political ties and human 
rights abuses.  To fully understand the context of the state-corporate crimes that occurred 
in this context, in Chapter Two: Historical Context, I will briefly introduce the history of 
colonization and recent events in the DRC.  An understanding of local ethnic conflict 
within the Ituri region will also be covered.  In Chapter Three: Literature Review, I will 
then provide a review relevant literature in the fields of state crime, corporate crime, and 
state-corporate crime.  The theoretical foundations of Model I, and of Model II used by 
Mullins and Rothe (2008), will be outlined in Chapter Four: Theoretical Approach, and I 
will describe the levels and categories of each model.  Chapter Five: Methods, provides a 
brief examination of case studies and the extended case method, where I discuss the 
benefits and limitations of using the case study approach and qualitative data.  In Chapter 
Six: Case Study, the application of Model I will be applied to the DRC conflict to explain 
4 
the perpetration of state-corporate crime by various parties.  Concluding this study, I will 
discuss the current status of events in the DRC, the research implications and limitations 
of this case study, and the direction for future research.   
  
Figure 1: Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(University of Texas, 1998
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) 
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Figure 2: Map of Major Mineral Deposits in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(As cited in Human Rights Watch, 2005) 
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Chapter Two: Historical Context 
 The Great Lakes region of Central Africa encompasses Rwanda, Burundi, eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and southwestern Uganda (Lemarchand, 2009).  
Recent violence in the region, such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide, has bled over 
national borders, and exacerbated preexisting tensions in that region contributing to war, 
human rights abuses, and state-corporate crime in the DRC.  To better understand the 
underlying causes of such conflict the historical background of the DRC and Rwanda 
must be reviewed. 
Colonization  
Although it had been victim of the European slave trade, the region that would 
become the DRC was considered for colonization in 1878 after exploration by Henry 
Morton Stanley’s Congo River expedition.  King Leopold II of Belgium established 
control of the Congo River basin in 1885, named the Congo Free State until 1908.  Under 
Leopold’s private control, forced labor allowed for the construction of the railroad and 
extraction of natural resources including red rubber.  Resistance to labor exploitation was 
met with Leopold’s private army of African soldiers and European officers, who used 
violent tactics including arson, murder, and amputation to force submission.  News of the 
human rights abuses in the Congo Free State reached the international stage in 1908, and 
in addition to state profits, resulted in the removal of these holding from Leopold, which 
were then placed under Belgian rule (Gondola, 2002; McKenna, 2011). 
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 Leopold’s brutal influence on the Congo River basin sowed the seeds of anti-
Western sentiment.  Known as Belgian Congo, the violence and terror of the Congo Free 
State declined while political oppression held strong.  However, the interest in political 
reform grew as neighboring countries were decolonized after World War II.  The post-
war period also saw a dramatic increase in copper and gold production, with mining 
conditions similar to those that existed during Leopold’s reign (Gondola, 2002).  By 
1957, when local government was reformed, unrest was increasing, as the Congolese 
people desired democratic opportunities.  On June 30, 1959, Belgium granted 
independence to Belgian Congo, after nationalist riots led by Joseph Kasavubu erupted 
(McKenna, 2011). 
Decolonization 
 Days after being granted independence, a series of events wreaked havoc on the 
new nation of the DRC.  The Congolese army mutinied as Belgian soldiers sought to 
protect Belgian citizens.  Months later, President Kasavubu ousted Prime Minister Patrice 
Lumumba.  By July, the Katanga province, backed by Belgium, asserted independence.  
Viewing the Belgian backing as an attempt to regain control of the region, Kasavubu and 
Lumumba sought assistance from the United Nations.  Kasavubu resisted the use of force 
by U.N. peacekeepers to reunite Katanga, leading Lumumba to seek assistance from the 
Soviet Union.  In September 1960, army Chief of Staff Mobutu Sese Seko declared 
martial rule, and partnered with a caretaker government.  Lumumba was subsequently 
executed and the Katanga secession was quelled.  A series of leaders took office as prime 
minister, including Cyrille Adoula and Tshombe, resulting in a relatively unstable 
government.  Following another defeated succession challenge and civil unrest in 1964, 
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Mobutu led a second coup and took power from President Kasavubu and current Prime 
Minister Tshombe (Birmingham, 1995; Gondola, 2002; McKenna, 2011).   
 Within Mobutu’s first two years in office, the DRC faced two riots led by 
mercenaries under the direction of Mobutu’s opposition.  This short period of mutiny was 
followed by years of peace, during which Mobutu attempted and failed to improve the 
DRC’s economy.  By 1971, Mobutu renamed the nation Zaire and enforced a single-party 
political system until 1990.  From 1977 until 1978 Mobutu faced an invasion by the 
opposition group Front de la Libération Nationale Congolaise (Congolese National 
Liberation Front, FLNC), displaying the continued unrest that existed under Mobutu’s 
regime.  With the end of the Cold War, the international stage also began calling for 
increased democratic actions.  In response, Mobutu allowed opposing political parties but 
negated these reforms by violently ending student protests at the local university.  
Following a reduction in international aid, Mobutu supported democratic reforms and 
elections, which were never enacted.  The Rwandan genocide that occurred from 1993 to 
1994 not only gave Mobutu an opening to re-establish ties to France, Belgium, and the 
United States, but also permitted an opportunity for attacking citizens of Rwandan Tutsi 
heritage.  Supporting Hutu factions ultimately led to the end of Mobutu’s long-standing 
regime (McKenna, 2011).  The genocide also led to massive emigrant of the Hutu 
population. 
First Congo War 
In November 1996, Mobutu was forced out of office after a thirty-two year rule.  
The rebel group Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre 
(Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire, ADFL), led by 
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Laurent Desiré Kabila, seized control of Zaire, which he renamed the DRC.  The ADFL 
was a newly formed organization backed by neighboring Rwanda, and thus mainly 
constituted by Rwandan Tutsis and Banyamulenge, who were Tutsi Rwandans from 
eastern DRC.   Not only did the ADFL march through the DRC to its capital, Kinshasa, 
resulting in the expulsion of Mobutu, but the Tutsi-comprised army also escalated 
tensions between Hutu refugees who had fled the Rwandan genocide (Ngolet, 2011; 
Renton, Seddon, & Zeilig, 2006; Turner, 2007).  The ADFL attacked refugee camps in an 
attempt to force the Hutu refugees to return to Rwanda.  Thousands attempted to return to 
Rwanda, which was made difficult by closed borders, and the hatred and fear after the 
1994 Hutu-led genocide.  The other thousands of Rwandan refugees largely traveled 
west.  These systematic massacres of the refugees from the Rwandan genocide provoked 
a longstanding conflict between the United Nations (UN) and the Kabila regime.  After a 
year of evasive attempts by the Kabila government, investigations into human rights 
violations by the UN produced one report resulting in inconclusive findings concerning 
state crime committed by Kabila’s regime (Ngolet, 2011; Turner, 2007). 
In March 1997, after nearly a year in power, Kabila agreed that a transitional 
government was to be created, lasting one year, and would exclude any former members 
of Mobutu’s regime.  Included in his move to create a transitional government, Kabila 
outlawed opposing political parties (Gondola, 2002; Ngolet, 2011).  Later, the ban of 
political parties would be extended to two years (Ngolet, 2011).  In addition to the seeds 
of discontent sowed by Kabila in the political scene, as the ADFL regime swept the DRC, 
ethnic tensions also began to rise.  Within the regime, offices were frequently 
undermined or opposed by Rwandan Tutsi or Banyamulenge members of staff (Gondola, 
11 
2002; Ngolet, 2011).  By January 1998, Kabila created a new administration that kept 
earlier members of the government in power, and was restructured to display the 
increased power of the Katangans, Kabila’s home province in the DRC.  Dissatisfaction 
and tension rose among the Tutsis, resulting in the ordered expulsion of Rwandan 
soldiers from the DRC on July 27, 1998 (Ngolet, 2011; Renton et al., 2006).  As Rwanda 
was losing power in the DRC, Kabila was courting military ties in Zimbabwe.  
Dissatisfaction among the Banyamulenge led to rebellion on August 2, 1998 (Ngolet, 
2011). 
Second Congo War 
The DRC faced the outbreak of a second war in as many years, when leaders 
within the DRC’s military denounced Kabila.  In return, the Kabila regime focused blame 
on Rwandans and Ugandans as instigators of the rebellion in eastern DRC.  In addition to 
discontent in the east, uprisings occurred in Kinshasa and Kisangani as Rwandan soldiers 
fought orders to leave the DRC.  As the rebel coalition, with the assistance of the 
Rwandan and Ugandan armies, continued to hold more land, the DRC population was left 
unstable.  Based on increasing ethnic tensions, public order diminished (Ngolet, 2011).   
Rebellion soon disintegrated into full-scale war, as Zimbabwe provided military 
assistance to the Kabila regime ten days after the uprising began.  With the assistance of 
forces from Angola, and nominal help from Namibia, Kabila began to retake rebel 
holdings.  A month later, under continued fighting, a Sudanese rebel group sided with the 
DRC rebel groups.  By December 1998, dissention spread as Ugandan and Rwandan 
forces sought more control over the rebel movement, with each supporting different DRC 
rebel groups.  By July 10, 1999, representatives from the DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola, 
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Namibia, Uganda, and Rwanda signed a ceasefire agreement in Lusaka, Zambia (Renton 
et al., 2006; Ngolet, 2011). 
January 2001 brought both Kabila’s death and a history of repeated violations of 
the Lusaka ceasefire.  Later that month, Kabila’s son, General Joseph Kabila, was sworn 
into the presidential office.  Although Joseph Kabila was intent on resuming the Lusaka 
ceasefire, political oppression and conflict between rebel factions continued, particularly 
in northern DRC where ethnic conflict led to violence (Ngolet, 2011).  Several attempts 
were made throughout 2001 to withdraw foreign troops, ultimately resulting in 
deployment of UN peacekeepers to the DRC.  By 2003, a transitional government was 
established following the final withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces (Human 
Rights Watch, 2005; Turner, 2007).   
Conflict in the Ituri Region 
The northeastern region of the DRC, including North and South Kivu provinces, 
Orientale province, and the Ituri region have a high concentration of mineral resources, 
including copper, cobalt, diamonds, and gold (Ezekiel, 2007).  In addition to holding 
heavy concentrations of mineral riches, the northeastern region has faced ethnic tensions 
for many years.  Dating back to 1964, the constitution restricted Congolese nationality to 
those whose ancestors lived in the DRC before 1908 (Kisangani, 2012).  This revision in 
the constitution was the first of many policy changes that affected the nationality of 
various ethnic groups, causing many to lose or have restricted voting rights.  In 1987, 
under Mobutu, a policy was passed that divided Kivu province into three separate 
provinces to decentralize Kivu and increase government accountability (Kisangani, 
2012).  This policy created enough confusion that some areas, such as North Kivu 
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province, were unable to hold elections.  Ultimately, continued exclusion of ethnic 
groups led to the first ethnic war in North Kivu, in 1993.  The influx of Hutu refugees 
from the Rwandan genocide created a new ethnic dynamic in the region, which initiated 
additional conflicts in the area. 
The neighboring Ituri region has had a history of ethnic oppression and 
exclusionary policy.  The roots of conflict in the Ituri region reach back to Belgian 
colonial rule, when groups of Lendu repeatedly revolted in response to discriminatory 
decrees and social policies (Kisangani, 2012).  The pattern continued, as Mobutu gave the 
Hema minority preferential land access at the expense of the Lendu in 1973.  Ethnic 
tensions continued through the First Congo War, during which the Ugandan-backed 
Congolese Rally for Democracy – Liberation Movement (Rassemblement Congolais pour 
la Démocratie—Mouvement de Libération, RCD-ML) occupied the region.  Lone groups 
began disseminating ethnic hatred, increasing the rising tensions.  On June 19, 1999, a 
clash between the Hema and Lendu ended with 700 people killed.  Conflict continued 
until July 2005, with estimates ranging from 80,000 to 100,000 people killed.   
Mongbwalu, a gold mining town, was the center of the Ituri violence.  Between 
2002 and 2003, the RCD-ML became embroiled in the Hema and Lendu conflict.  In 
2002, the Rwandan-supported Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriots 
Congolais, UPC) was formed by the Hema, and clashed with the RCD-ML.  In response, 
the RCD-ML began targeting Hema civilians, which led to the retaliatory targeting of 
Lendu civilians by the UPC.  Shortly after, Uganda withdrew backing for the RCD-ML, 
while the RCD-ML turned to the Lendu militia.  The UPC was able to take control of 
Bunia, the capital of Ituri, and Mongbwalu.  The attack on Mongbwalu on November 18, 
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2002, was an ethnically charged massacre, as Lendu civilians were indiscriminately 
killed.  The Mongbwalu massacre was repeated a month later in Kilo, a neighboring 
town.  Additional human rights abuses occurred under UPC rule, including subjective 
arrests, torture, and forced labor in the gold mines (Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
By 2003, the UPC splintered into two groups and lost Mongbwalu.  Ugandan 
forces turned their support to the Lendu group, Front des Nationalistes et 
Intégrationnistes (Nationalist and Integrationist Front, FNI).  Less than a year after the 
UPC-led massacre, Kilo became the grounds for a second, FNI-led massacre, with Hema 
victims.  Additional conflicts between the FNI and UPC ensued, producing FNI led 
“witch hunts” to find and prosecute Hema women, and ongoing subjective arrests, 
torture, and forced labor continued into 2003, when FNI gained control of the 
Mongbwalu gold mines.  
 The qualitative overview provided above lays out a general description of the 
series of conflicts in the DRC region, and the extent of government suppression, the 
history of internal conflicts, and state violence.  These materials are subjected to further 
analysis following a description of the state crime and state-corporate crime literature 
within criminology. 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
 Although less prevalent than street crime theory and research, in the 
criminological field, sufficient research on state-corporate crime has been yielded to 
create a foundation for further exploration of the state crimes committed in the DRC.  
Addressing the roots of both state crime, corporate crime, and the intersecting topic of 
state-corporate crime provides a more detailed grasp of the literature and theoretical 
response to these forms of crime. 
State Crime 
The study of state-corporate crime has come into focus in the field of criminology 
over the last twenty-five years.  Chambliss (1988) first sparked criminological interest in 
the area when he reviewed the historical occurrence of state-sponsored piracy, 
smuggling, and murder.  He defines state-organized crime as, “acts defined by law as 
criminal and committed by state officials in the pursuit of their jobs as representatives of 
the state” (Chambliss, 1988, p.184).  State-organized crime occurs when law prohibits the 
actions of the state.  The state must take action illegally, to circumvent the law and 
achieve the desired events.  
Various case studies and reviews have populated the field of state crime research 
(e. g., Friedrichs, 1998, 2010a, 2010b; Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998; Kramer & 
Michalowski, 1990, 2006; Kramer, Michalowski, & Kauzlarich, 2002; Mullins & Rothe, 
2008), while recent publications have expounded upon the intricacies of state crime.  
Various aspects of this literature are examined below.   
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Green and Ward (2004) contributed a comprehensive assessment of the forms 
state crime may take.  The authors detailed state crime occurring through corporate 
means, including: negligence in natural disaster recovery, police violence and corruption, 
government involvement with organized crime, state-sponsored terrorism, torture, war 
crimes, and genocide.   
It is important to keep in mind that political economic motivations drive state 
crime to varying degrees.  Crossover between these types of state crime identified by 
Green and Ward are not precluded, and real world state-corporate crime may often cross 
these theoretical boundaries.  This is true, for example, in this case study of the DRC in 
which state-corporate crime involves international corporations, foreign governments of 
Rwanda and Uganda, political corruption, and control of natural resources such as gold. 
In 2009, Rothe focused on the theoretical background, the perpetration of state 
crime by democratic and non-democratic governments, and controls and constraints that 
limit state crime.  Rothe (2009) reviewed traditional criminological theories and 
emphasized the need for an integrated approach that considered international context; 
“the value of an integrated theory is only such if it is manageable and/or useful for 
explaining crimes” (Rothe, 2009, p. 100).  Instead, Rothe suggests using the Integrated 
Theory of International Criminal Law Violations (p. 102), an adapted version of previous 
models by Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998), Rothe (2006), Rothe and Mullins (2006, 2007, 
2008) and Mullins and Rothe (2008).  For the purpose of this study it will be referred to 
as the Rothe model.  This model incorporates features of anomie, social disorganization, 
social learning, and structure-strain theories at four levels of analysis.  In laying out this 
argument, Rothe argues for the need to address the international level, macro level, meso 
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level, and micro levels of analysis in relation to each theoretical dimension of the 
explanation, meaning that motivations, opportunities, constraints, and controls are 
examined at each level of analysis. 
In Rothe’s (2009) book the variety of government structures that produce state 
crime are reviewed.  Democratic governments typically use covert methods to support 
criminal acts, while non-democratic governments engaged in state crime share historical, 
economic, and political patterns. 
For this study, I will be using the definition of state crime Kauzlarich and Kramer 
(1998) adopt from Friedrich (1995), which addresses the distinction between acts of the 
state as an organization and individual political actors.  As a broad, organizational 
definition, governmental crime includes all crime conducted in relation to the 
government.  Governmental crime includes two subsets of crime, political white-collar 
crime and state crime.  Political white-collar crimes are the illegal acts committed by 
government officials and politicians.  State crime, then, refers to illegal activities, 
“carried out by the state or on behalf of some state agency” (Friedrich, 1995, p. 54).  
Corporate Crime 
While the prominence of state crime in criminological research has occurred over 
the last thirty years, the study of white-collar crime, a precursor to corporate crime, has 
gained notice since 1940.  Sutherland (1940) first noted the occurrence of crime among 
upper class professional men, terming it “white-collar crime.”  It was theorized that 
differential association, when criminality is learned through association with criminal 
peers, led to the occurrence of white-collar crime.  Additionally, social disorganization 
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permits the criminal association to occur, as the community is not organized to withstand 
criminal behavior.    
Twenty years later, Quinney (1964) addressed the need for a clarified definition 
of white-collar crime.  The nebulous definition of white-collar crime popular in 
criminological literature did not lend itself to use in categorizing aspects of white-collar 
crime, and instead allowed for criminologists to vary the conceptualization of white-
collar since no standardization of white-collar crime was implemented.  Quinney (1964) 
noted that the definition of white-collar crime must be limited in order to further 
scientific research on this topic.  While Sutherland (1940) defined white-collar offenders 
to be upper class professionals, Quinney (1964) advocates for the, “expansion of the 
concept to include all violations that occur in the course of occupational activity—
regardless of the offender’s social status” (p.210). 
With the existence of white-collar crime, criminologists have struggled to provide 
an accepted definition of the act.  Friedrich (1992) attempted to bridge the definitional 
gap between the assorted camps of criminologists who do or do not believe white-collar 
crime can be operationally defined, or seek an explicit and detailed definition rather than 
an ambiguous definition.  Using three stages to define white-collar crime: presentational, 
typological, and operational, Friedrich (1992) offers five types of crime related to white-
collar activity: corporate crime, occupational crime, governmental crime, residual white-
collar crime, and advocational crime.  State-corporate crime is considered a residual 
white-collar crime, which includes, “hybrid and marginal types of white collar crime” 
(p.15).   
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Differing from white-collar crime is corporate crime, which refers to, “the illegal 
activities of large corporations, generally the larger industrial corporations (the Fortune 
500 or 1,000) and the executives acting on their behalf.  It involves violations of laws, 
statutes and regulatory standards affecting corporations for corporate profit and not for 
the sake of personal gain by an individual (or groups of individuals) working for the 
corporation” (Clinard, Quinney, & Wildeman, 2010, p. 191).  A simplified definition will 
be used for this study, in which corporate crime is identified as “the offenses committed 
by corporate officials for their corporation and the offenses of the corporation itself” 
(Clinard & Quinney, 1973, p.188). 
State-Corporate Crime 
The integration of state and corporate crime to form a new field of study occurred 
relatively recently.  The topic of state crime covers a wide array of criminality, including 
state-corporate crime, environmental crime, political crimes, and state-international 
organized crime (Rothe, 2009).  For the purpose of this case study, state-corporate crime 
will be defined as, “criminal acts that occur when one or more institutions of political 
governance pursue a goal in direct cooperation with one or more institutions of economic 
production and distribution” (Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998, p.10).   
It was Kramer (1990) who conducted one of the earliest state-corporate crime 
case studies by looking at the roles of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
and the corporation Morton Thiokol in the Challenger shuttle disaster.  Additional state-
corporate crime case studies followed, as Matthews and Kauzlarich (2000) reviewed the 
crash of ValuJet flight 592 and negligence by the Federal Aviation Administration and 
maintenance company SabreTech.  Case studies have also been increasingly presented on 
20 
state-corporate crimes occurring abroad, such as Dutch collusion in the construction 
industry (Van den Heuvel, 2006), and private security regulation in the United Kingdom 
(Whyte, 2003).   
Prior to the theoretical framework first proposed by Kramer and Michalowski 
(1990) there was little application of theory to state-corporate crime research.  Various 
theories have been applied to state crime and corporate crime, particularly Sutherland’s 
(1940) differential association and Syke’s and Matza’s (1957) techniques of 
neutralization (e.g. Chirayath, Eslinger, & De Zolt, 2002; Piquero, Tibbetts, & 
Blankenship, 2005; Vieratitis, Piquero, Piquero, Tibbetts, & Blankship, 2012).  However, 
Kramer and Michalowski (1990) integrated differential association, organizational 
theory, and political-economic perspective to explain state-corporate crime, which was 
expanded upon by Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998).  By incorporating each theory at a 
different level of analysis, actors at the individual, corporate, and state level could be 
recognized. 
State-corporate crime in the DRC.  Relatively little attention has been paid 
within the criminological literature to the state-corporate crime occurring in the DRC, 
which has involved international corporations and foreign governments.  In doing so, 
Ward (2005) reviewed the occurrence of state crime in the Congo Free State (1885-
1908), and the human rights abuses sponsored by Belgium’s King Leopold II.  Ward 
(2005) applied Merton’s (1938) anomie theory to the privatized ruling of the Congo Free 
State.  Ward argued that Europeans faced strain when unable to reach rubber and ivory 
production goals, eventually resolving the situation of strain by resorting to tactics of 
extreme terror and violence.  Using anomie theory in conjunction with differential 
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association, Ward (2005) indicates that, “economically motivated violence will tend to 
escalate to seemingly irrational levels” (p. 439).  Within organizational violence, 
subsequent acts of violence become progressively easier to both commit and witness 
(Ward, 2005, p. 441). 
 Mullins and Rothe (2008) provided one of the only criminological reviews of the 
DRC conflict, applying an integrated state-corporate model based upon previous work by 
Kramer and Michalowski (1990) and Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998), which they further 
developed (as cited in Mullins & Rothe, 2008).  The integrated model utilizes four levels 
of analysis: international, macro, meso, and micro. These levels of analysis are then used 
to examine the motivations, opportunities, constraints, and controls of actors at each 
level.  At each level, factors contribute to produce strain for involved parties.  Mullins 
and Rothe (2008) found that at the international level, Rwanda and Uganda were 
politically and economically motivated to control areas of the DRC for profit and power.  
Internationally, little could be done with the exception of United Nations tribunal 
intervention after the conflict occurred.  The macro level included the political and 
economic instability in the region during the post-colonial era.  The political instability 
and ethnic tensions continued, as local militias gained power in isolated areas of the 
DRC.  Mullins and Rothe (2008) used the meso, or organizational, level to focus on the 
ethnic bias and paramilitary structure of local militias and the economically driven 
transnational corporations.  At the micro level, individuals with power seek economic and 
political gain while others are motivated by community disorganization to join local 
militias. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
Like state crime, corporate crime also faces conceptual issues.  Many 
criminologists have attempted to tease out the definitional differences between criminal 
acts committed by individuals and organizations, while considering the career of the 
individual and type of organization.  Theories, ranging from differential association and 
techniques of neutralization, to strain theory have been applied to state crime, corporate 
crime, and white-collar crime.  State-corporate crime is part of, and faces, similar 
conceptual issues. 
While the literature on state-corporate crime has multiplied, a lack of 
proportionate interest continues to exist when looking at the severity of these crimes.  
Currently, there is little theory-based research on state-corporate crime.  A more thorough 
theoretical application to case studies would benefit current research.  Integrated models, 
such as the one used by Kramer and Michalowski (1990) and Kauzlarich and Kramer 
(1998) emphasize the theoretical foundation of state-corporate crime while addressing the 
many actors that contribute to state-corporate crime at varying levels.   
Rothe (2009) expands upon this integrated theory by providing an additional level 
of analysis, the international level, and a category of controls at each level.  However, 
while the model attempts to further identify the actions and causes of state-corporate 
crime, parsimony is lost.  As Lynch, Long, and Stretesky (2012) argue, the nature of this 
model results in a loss of any attempts at parsimony and therefore cannot be empirically 
evaluated.  While the original integrated model (Kramer & Michalowski, 1990; 
Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998) may also be viewed as too complex, it addresses the very 
complex nature of state-corporate crime as clear-cut as possible.   
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Additionally, little research has been conducted on the DRC crisis.  One of the 
only articles applying criminological theory to this occurrence of state-corporate crime is 
Mullins and Rothe (2008).  Rather than following their lead and applying the Rothe 
model to the DRC, I will use the model posited by Kramer, Michalowski, and Kauzlarich, 
to provide a more parsimonious interpretation of the events resulting in the occurring of 
state-corporate crime in the DRC. 
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Chapter Four: Theoretical Approaches to State-Corporate Crime 
Relatively little research has been conducted on state-corporate crime in the 
criminological literature, especially in relation to traditional forms of criminological 
research.  Kramer and Michalowski posit state-corporate crimes as forms of 
organizational deviance in which, “…illegal or socially injurious actions that occur when 
one or more institutions of political governance pursue a goal in direct cooperation with 
one or more institutions of economic production and distribution” (as cited in Kramer et 
al., 2002, p. 270).  There are two forms state-corporate crime may take, state-initiated 
corporate crime or state-facilitated corporate crime.  State-initiated corporate crime is the 
result of government-employed corporations taking part in criminal activities with 
government approval or direction.  State-facilitated corporate crime occurs when 
government regulation is not effective, and corporations take criminal actions, either 
because of collusion or as a result of the desire to reach shared goals (Kramer et al., 
2002).  In this case study, the DRC’s transitional government knowingly granted 
AngloGold Ashanti the gold concession in the Ituri province, where government control 
was minimal or non-existent.  By selling the concession to AngloGold Ashanti, the state-
run Office of the Gold Mines of Kilo-Moto (OKIMO) participated in state-facilitated 
corporate crime.  OKIMO received the benefits of selling the concession, while 
AngloGold Ashanti had access to a rich gold mining operation, which was likely to allow 
rebel forces to profit (Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
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An Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime (Model I) 
Kramer and Michalowski (1990) first suggested an integrated theoretical 
approach to state-corporate crime, which was later revised by Kauzlarich and Kramer 
(1998).  The integrated theoretical model (Model I) includes three levels: institutional 
environment (I.1), organizational (I.2), and interaction (I.3).  At each level, the theoretical 
approach is altered to better address the actors at an individual, corporate, and state level.  
Furthermore, Kramer and Michalowski incorporate catalysts for action into the 
theoretical view.  Motivation (A), opportunity structure (B), and operationality of control 
(C) are considered at every level of analysis.  The catalysts for action include 
subcomponents that vary at each level, and address the factors that promote or deter 
criminal action.  Motivation refers to the ability to achieve goals; opportunity structure is 
the opportunity and desire to use illegal means; and operationality of control is defined by 
the lack of social control.  The pressures faced at each level are the result of an 
intersection of the individual level and each catalyst (Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998).  
These definitional concepts are described in greater detail below.  A summary of the 
main components of the integrated model (Model I) can be found in Table 1. 
Institutional environment (I.1).  The institutional environment level is a macro 
view that examines the historical context, culture, politics, and economy related to a 
given instance of state-corporate crime.  In this view, political economic theory addresses 
the wider context of white-collar crime.  Political economy theory places capitalism 
central to the cause of corporate and state crime, citing the financial incentives capitalism 
provides that drives organizations such as corporations to attain particular economic 
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goals.  As Barnett (1981) commented, “…the type of offenses committed by the 
corporation will depend on the relevant market constraints and the severity of the related 
legal constraint; that is, a corporation will tend to circumvent those constraints  
Table 1: An Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime [Model I] 
 
Catalysts for Analysis 
Levels of 
Analysis 
Motivation [A] Opportunity Structure [B] Operationality of 
Control [C] 
Institutional 
environment 
(history, political 
economy, 
culture) [1] 
Culture of 
competition 
Economic 
pressure 
Organizational 
goals 
Performance 
emphasis 
Availability of legal 
means 
Obstacles & constraints 
Blocked goals/strain 
Availability of illegal 
means 
Access to resources 
International 
reactions 
Political pressure 
Legal sanctions 
Media scrutiny 
Public opinion 
Social movements 
Organizational 
(structure and 
process) [2] 
Corporate 
culture 
Operative goals 
Subunit goals 
Managerial 
pressure 
Instrumental rationality 
Internal constraints 
Defective SOPs 
Creation of illegal means 
Role specialization 
Task segregation 
Computer, 
telecommunication, and 
networking strategies 
Normalization of 
deviance 
Culture of 
compliance 
Subcultures of 
resistance 
Codes of conduct 
Reward structure 
Safety & quality 
control procedures 
Communication 
processes 
Interaction (face-
to-face 
interaction, 
individual 
action) [3] 
Socialization 
Social meaning 
Individual goals 
Competitive 
individualism 
Material success 
emphasis 
Definition of situation 
Perceptions of availability 
& attractiveness of illegal 
means 
               
Personal morality 
Rationalizations & 
techniques of 
neutralization 
Separation from 
consequences 
Obedience to 
authority  
Group think 
Diffusion of 
responsibility 
Kauzlarich & Kramer (1998, p. 149) 
 
 whose violation will yield the greatest expected net change in profits” (p.5).  Comparable 
to organizational theory, political economic theory concentrates on the structural origins 
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of organizational goals that drive the organization to commit illegal acts.  However, 
political economic theory emphasizes the influence and deterrence provided by the 
historical and institutional context of society on organizational behavior (Kauzlarich & 
Kramer, 1998).  
  Catalysts for action.  At this level, not only does the historical, cultural, and 
economic context need to be reviewed, but their influence on individual decisions must 
also be considered.   
Motivation (I.1.A).  Within the institutional environment, motivating factors 
include the “culture of competition, economic pressure, organizational goals, and an 
emphasis on performance” (Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998, p.149).  The drive for increased 
economic stability and financial gains, for both the government and individuals, and 
longstanding emphasis on a need to succeed for the welfare of the country may drive the 
use of illegitimate means to acquire financial resources.   
Opportunity structure (I.1.B).  Opportunity structures at this level are viewed as 
the “availability of legal means, any impediments or limits, blocked goals or strain, 
degree of accessibility to illegal options and resources” (Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998, 
p.149).  Although political economic theory is the primary theory utilized at this level, 
constraints that emerge when accessing legal options and goal obstructions can also be 
tied directly to strain or anomie theory in both its structural and individual level versions 
(Merton, 1938; Cohen, 1955; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Agnew, 1992).  Strain occurs 
when an individual attempts to achieve societal goals and is prevented from doing so by 
the organization of society and the legitimate opportunities for achieving success.  Crime 
may be a response to achieve goals or to relieve negative emotions that result from the 
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inability to attain socially approved goals.  Agnew, Piquero, and Cullen (2009) applied 
general strain theory to white-collar crime.  They argued that white-collar crime occurs as 
a response to economic strain, which is an, “important cause of white-collar crimes 
committed for personal gain, such as embezzlement, as well as corporate crimes, such as 
antitrust violations” (Agnew et al., 2009, p. 36).  Although in this instance Agnew, 
Piquero, and Cullen (2009) applied strain to white-collar criminals, the application may 
be mirrored to explain criminal actions committed by government officials in state 
crimes. 
Operationality of control (I.1.C).  At the institutional environment level, controls 
include, “international reactions, political pressure, legal sanctions, media scrutiny, public 
opinion, social movements” (Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998, p.149), which are often 
enforced by other nations and international organizations. 
 Organizational level (I.2).  At this level of analysis, organizational theory is used 
to explain crime at the corporate level.  Organizational theory provides an answer to 
some of the conceptual issues of white-collar crime.  Particularly, this approach suggests 
that individuals are considered white-collar criminals regardless of their relationship to 
the organization, or whether that relationship is defined by a connection to the state or 
corporation. Schrager and Short (1978) state that, “…it is often impossible to determine 
individual responsibility for illegal actions committed in accordance with the operative 
goals of organizations” (p.407).  Rather than point to individuals, organizational theory 
views the organization as the perpetrator and attempts to assess the ways in which 
organizational structures impact the commission of crime. 
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Anomie theory has previously been studied in conjunction with organizational 
theory, and this level of analysis accordingly incorporates an anomic perspective (e.g. 
Passas, 1990; as cited in Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998).  Merton (1938) specifically 
pinpoints anomie as a result of failing to meet economic goals, rather than other social 
goals or the occurrence of negative emotions addressed by Agnew’s (1992) general strain 
theory.  Within organizational theory, an organization may experience strain in the same 
way an individual does when goals are not reached.  More specifically, this approach 
suggests that “organizational crime is more likely to occur when illegitimate 
opportunities for achieving the organization’s goals are available to organizational 
actors” (Braithwaite, 1989, p.338). 
Catalysts for action.  With respect to this concept in the case of DRC state-
corporate crime, particular attention may be focused on the interactions between 
corporate representatives and rebel forces in the Ituri region.  Catalysts for action at this 
level of analysis look at deviance within the corporate environment, including business 
goals and a culture of compliance.  In addition, catalysts for actions include several 
components that need to be examined.  
Motivation ( I.2.A).  At the organizational level, the corporation is reviewed with 
an emphasis on the, “existing corporate culture, business goals, and issues faced by the 
managerial unit, such as need to increase company productivity” (Kauzlarich & Kramer, 
1998, p.149).  The question here is how specific organizational motivation rather than the 
more general structural motivations influence a state-corporate crime.   
Opportunity structure (I.2.B).  Opportunities within the corporate environment 
present themselves as, “instrumental rationality, internal constraints, defective SOPs 
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[Standard Operating Procedures], creation of illegal means, role specialization, task 
segregation, computer, telecommunication, and networking technologies, normalization 
of deviance” (Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998, p.149).  These organizational features can 
facilitate the occurrence of state-corporate crime, and can interact with organizational 
motivations in the production of state-corporate crime. 
Operationality of control (I.2.C).   At the organizational level, operationality of 
control is defined as “culture of compliance, subcultures of resistance, codes of conduct, 
reward structure, safety and quality control procedures, communication processes” 
(Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998, p.149).  In this sense, the organizational culture and the 
tendency for state-corporate crime can be facilitated or restricted by organizational 
controls evident in each of the involved organizations. 
 Interaction level (I.3).  The interaction level of analysis considers how 
individuals navigate and respond to various structural and organizational contexts.  The 
interaction level may, for example, lead to further review of the actions of the leaders of 
rebel forces, such as FNI, in order to determine how individuals and organizations 
interact.   Sutherland’s (1940, 1949) theory of differential association is utilized at this 
level, to address how criminogenic actions are influenced by peer associations.  If peers 
do not view the commission of crime positively, it is nevertheless possible for criminality 
to develop independently from peer influences.  In either case, the individual’s positive 
attitudes towards crime must be greater than their negative attitudes to result in 
participation in criminal activity.  It particular, Sutherland (1949) noted that differential 
association may occur in a corporate setting when a business undertakes illegal actions 
for profit, leading to a competing business to also participate in illegal means for 
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financial gains.  The secondary company may choose illegal practices to maintain or 
increase their level of competition to that of the first company.  Sutherland (1949) 
emphasized the level of isolation of many businessmen when developing attitudes 
towards white-collar crime.  The media outlets naturally convey crime negatively, but 
there is often a different emphasis on white-collar crime, if it is mentioned.  News outlets 
may not provide comparable coverage of white-collar crimes because they, “…derive 
their principal income from advertisements by other business corporations and would be 
likely to lose a considerable part of this income if they were critical of business practices 
in general or those of particular corporations…these public agencies of communication 
themselves participate in white collar crimes” (Sutherland, 1949, p. 247). 
Catalysts for action.   
Motivation (I.3.A).  At the interaction level, catalysts for action involve 
“individual socialization, social meaning, individual goals, competitive individualism, 
material success emphasis” (Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998, p.149).  Catalysts for actions 
have variety of dimensions. 
Opportunity structure (I.3.B).  Opportunities for individuals to commit illegal acts 
are dependent upon the, “definition of situation, perception of availability and 
attractiveness of illegal means” (Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998, p.149).  Individual 
perceptions of the opportunity structure in an organization may provide motivation for a 
state-corporate crime, and are an important issue to address when describing state-
corporate crimes. 
Operationality of control (I.3.C).  Controls that may inhibit criminal acts at the 
individual level include, “personal morality, rationalizations and techniques of 
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neutralization, separation from consequences, obedience to authority, group think, 
diffusion of responsibility” (Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998, p.149).  These individual levels 
of assessment can influence the interpretation of organizational structures, and whether 
those structures produce state-corporate crime.  Sykes and Matza (1957) theorized that to 
justify their criminal acts, individuals use the techniques of neutralization to rationalize 
their behavior.  Referring to them as, “…a crucial component of Sutherland’s ‘definitions 
favorable to the violation of the law’” (p. 667), techniques of neutralization include the 
denial of responsibility, injury, the victim, and a condemnation of the condemners.   
Integrated Theory of International Criminal Law Violations (Model II) 
 While the Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime put forth by 
Kramer and Michalowski (1990) and Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) will be the primary 
model applied to this case study, the Rothe model’s previous application to the DRC 
conflict (Mullins & Rothe, 2008) will provide a comparative look at the benefits of 
parsimony the Integrated Theoretical Model by Kramer, Michalowski, and Kauzlarich, 
provides.  Like the Integrated Theoretical Model, the Rothe model uses an integrated 
theoretical approach to address all levels of state crime, highlighting the affect of 
international actions on these crimes.  The Rothe model also offers variations on the 
catalysts of motivation, opportunity, and controls, with the addition of constraints.  While 
similar, a constraint is, “an inhibitor or barrier that occurs at the onset of or during an 
illegal action…a control, on the other hand, is a formal mechanism meant to block in full 
an illegal action or ideally hold accountable through prosecution, sanctions, or some form 
of social justice post-criminality” (Rothe, 2009, p.106).  A summary of the Rothe model 
(Model II) can be found in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Integrated Theory of International Criminal Law Violation [Model II] 
 Motivation  
[A] 
Opportunity  
[B] 
Constraints  
[C] 
Controls  
[D] 
International 
Level [1] 
Political 
interests 
Economic 
interests 
Resources 
Ideological 
interests 
International 
relations 
Economic 
supremacy 
Complementary 
legal systems 
International 
reaction 
Political 
pressure 
Public opinion 
social 
movements 
NGOs and 
INGOs 
Oversight/ 
Economic 
institutions 
International 
law 
International 
sanctions 
Macro Level 
[2] 
Structural 
transformations 
Economic 
pressure or 
goals 
Political goals 
Ethnogenses 
Anomie 
Availability of 
illegal means 
Control of 
information 
Propaganda  
Ideology/ 
nationalism 
Military 
capabilities 
Political 
pressure 
Media scrutiny 
Public opinion 
Social 
movements 
Rebellion 
Legal 
sanctions 
Domestic 
law 
Meso Level 
[3] 
Organizational 
culture and 
goals 
Authoritarian 
pressures 
Reward 
structures 
 
Communication 
structures 
Means 
availability 
Role 
specialization 
Internal 
oversight 
Communication 
structures 
Traditional 
authority 
structures 
Codes of 
conduct 
Micro Level 
[4] 
Strain 
Socialization 
Individual goals 
& ideologies 
Normalization 
of deviance 
Definition of 
situation 
Obedience to 
authority  
Group think  
Diffusion of 
responsibility  
Perceived 
illegal means 
Personal 
morality 
Socialization 
Obedience to 
authority 
Informal social 
controls 
Legitimacy 
of law 
Perception of 
reality of law 
application 
Rothe (2009, p.102) 
 
International level (II.1).  This level of analysis specifically examines the 
international climate surrounding the crime.  Rothe (2009) argues that “the institutional  
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elements and context of a state, its economic, political, cultural, and historical 
environment, is distinct from and often exhibits forces in contradiction with those 
elements at the international level” (p. 101). 
Motivation (II.1.A).  Motivations at an international level include, “political 
interests, economic interests, resources, and ideological interests” (Rothe, 2009, p. 102). 
Opportunity (II.1.B).  International level opportunities in the commission of 
state-corporate crime include “international relations, economic supremacy, military 
supremacy, and complementary legal systems” (Rothe, 2009, p. 102). 
 Constraints (II.1.C).  Constraints identify factors that limit the occurrence of 
state-corporate crime.  These limitations include, “international reaction, political 
pressure public opinion social movements, NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] 
and INGO [International Non-Governmental Organization], and oversight/economic 
institutions”  (Rothe, 2009, p. 102). 
Controls (II.1.D).  Controls are an extension of constraints, but focus on formal 
social control factors.  In addressing controls, particular attention is paid to the influence 
of laws, especially relevant “international law and international sanctions” (Rothe, 2009, 
p. 102), such as the Rome Statute, deter crime at this level from occurring or continuing. 
 Macro level (II.2).  The macro level examines the state government’s response to 
perpetrating the crime.  Rather than applying other versions of anomie or strain theory, 
the Rothe model uses Durkheim’s anomie to explain criminality by the state.  In this case, 
rather than referring directly to transformations from a mechanical to organic society 
Rothe views Durkheim’s (1913, 1951) anomie as the change to a society that occurs after 
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abrupt decolonization.  When this occurs, the society is left with little government 
regulation and weak institutions that do little to project social control    
 Motivation (II.2.A).  Motivations for the state at this level of analysis consist of, 
“structural transformations, economic pressure or goals, political goals, ethnogenses, and 
anomie” (Rothe, 2009, p. 102). 
 Opportunity (II.2.B).  Opportunity for state crime may use the “availability of 
illegal means, control of information, propaganda, ideology/nationalism, and military 
capabilities” (Rothe, 2009, p. 102). 
 Constraints (II.2.C).  There are a number of factors that may constrain the 
occurrence and development of state-corporate crime.  These constraints include 
“political pressure, media scrutiny, public opinion, social movements, and rebellion” 
(Rothe, 2009, p. 102), that may dissuade state governments to cease illegal behavior.  
 Controls (II.2.D).  Controls differ from constraints.  Controls primarily address 
the effect of law, such as “legal sanctions and domestic law” (Rothe, 2009, p. 102), that 
may discourage criminal pursuits at this level. 
 Meso level (II.3).  The meso level focuses on the organizational structure of the 
government or military committing the crime.  Rothe (2009) argues that while the use of 
organizational theory at this level in the Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate 
Crime may address criminogenic factors for western-style organizations, organizational 
theory cannot be easily applied to militias and paramilitary organizations.  Additionally, 
reward systems within corporations and other organizations may actually foster illegal 
activities, rather than prevent them.   
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 Instead of organization theory, social disorganization (Shaw & McKay, 1969; 
Bursik & Grasmick, 1993) factors are included to address military and paramilitary 
organizational concerns related to state-crime.  In this view, social disorganization can 
contribute to the establishment of militias and paramilitary groups.  Social 
disorganization theory states that as community organization decreases, crime increases.  
A disorganized community lacks an ability to exhibit social control and low collective 
efficacy, and military organizations can step in to fill that void.  
Differential association, strain theory, and social learning theory may also explain 
the actions of organizations at this level.  As previously mentioned, differential 
association (Sutherland, 1940) is the transmission of criminal behaviors from peer 
networks, and strain theory (Merton, 1938) refers to crime as the result of blocked goals 
that may appear to be accessible through illegal means.  Social learning theory (Akers, 
1973) applies differential association in conjunction with psychological principles of 
operant conditioning to explain why individuals commit crime. 
 Motivation (II.3.A).  Motivating factors at the meso level include “organizational 
culture and goals” (Rothe, 2009, p. 102). 
Opportunity (II.3.B).   “Communication structures, means availability, and role 
specialization” (Rothe, 2009, p. 102), provide opportunities for the perpetration of illegal 
acts by organizations. 
 Constraints (II.3.C).   At this level, “internal oversight, communication 
structures, and traditional authority structures” (Rothe, 2009, p. 102), hinder the 
organization from criminality. 
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 Controls (II.3.D).  The organization’s, “codes of conduct” (Rothe, 2009, p. 102), 
provide restraint in the case of state crime.  
 Micro level (II.4).  The micro level is used to examine individual actors that 
further the commission of state-corporate crime.  The Rothe model again utilizes 
differential association (Sutherland, 1940) and social learning theory (Akers, 1973) to 
explain that individuals would perpetrate illegal acts as a result of negative peer 
association and a series of rewards and punishments reinforcing the acceptance of 
criminal behavior.   
 Motivation (II.4.A).  At the micro level, individuals are motivated by, “strain, 
socialization, individual goals and ideologies, normalization of deviance, and definition 
of the situation” (Rothe, 2009, p. 102).  
 Opportunity (II.4.B).  Opportunities to further perpetrate state crime at this level 
include, “obedience to authority, group think, diffusion of responsibility, and perceived 
illegal means” (Rothe, 2009, p. 102). 
 Constraints (II.4.C).  “Personal morality, socialization, obedience to authority, 
and informal social controls” (Rothe, 2009, p. 102), are constraints that may effect 
whether an individual carries out illegal acts. 
 Controls (II.5.D).  The “legitimacy of law and perception of reality of law 
application” (Rothe, 2009, p. 102), control for criminality at the micro level. 
Summary and Conclusion 
 It is clear that while both models provide a comparable theoretical approach to 
state-corporate crime, the Rothe model incorporates an excess of theories to explain 
every nuance of state-corporate crime.  The Integrated Theoretical Approach to State-
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Corporate Crime already establishes an elaborate theoretical backdrop to explain state-
corporate crime, which then becomes limited by an entanglement of theories in the Rothe 
model.   
 The Rothe model is limited by data access to measure state crime.  As Rothe 
(2009) states, “…it [Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime, 
Kramer & Michalowski, 1990; Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998] is more of a theory that 
allows illumination of cases, instead of empirical prediction and testing.  Having said 
this, the value of an integrated theory is only such if it is manageable and/or useful for 
explaining crimes” (p.100).  Rather than using the Rothe model to provide empirical 
testing and prediction, data sources would likely not be available to adequately provide 
material for the Rothe model.  Data related to the micro and meso levels of analysis 
would be challenging to obtain, as few people would be willing to participate with 
researchers.  Additionally, Rothe emphasizes the meso level’s focus on militias and 
paramilitary groups, both of which would be difficult to gather data on.
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Chapter Five: Methods 
Case Study Approach 
 The case study approach has been greatly influenced by Richard Yin.  Yin (1994) 
argues that case studies are needed for researchers to preserve all factors of events.  The 
use of a case study in research is determined if the research question asks how or why, if 
behavior does not need to be controlled, and if a current event is being examined.  Often, 
case studies use “direct observation and systematic interviewing… a full variety of 
evidence—documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations” (Yin, 1994, p.8) to collect 
data.   
 Use of case study methods.  Case studies have become more commonly used in 
criminological research.  Often, the case study approach is utilized when a researcher is 
attempting to prevent the omission of crucial details from a subject’s narrative, or when 
studying a population that is difficult to reach for quantitative data collection.  In 
criminology, case studies have historically, though infrequently, been used to detail 
offenders and criminogenic situations (e.g. Blok, 1975; Gardiner & Olson, 1968; King & 
Chambliss, 1984; Shaw, 1930, 1931; Shaw, McKay, McDonald, 1938; Sutherland, 1937). 
 Case study approaches are frequently used in state-corporate crime.  The nature of 
the crimes usually entails the need for a case study approach using qualitative data.  
Traditionally, state-corporate crime entails at least two powerful entities acting illegally, 
making it difficult for researchers to collect data from individuals.  Using a case study 
approach has been the traditional method to examine state-corporate crime, using various 
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sources to present a whole, cohesive picture of the crime (Kramer, 1990; Matthews & 
Kauzlarich, 2000; Mullins & Rothe, 2008; Van den Heuvel, 2006; Whyte, 2003). 
 Advantages.  Occasionally, research must consider the contextual conditions of 
an event.   The case study research design is often used when background information is 
key to answering the research question.  In examining the DRC conflict, for example, it is 
crucial to understand the multitude of contextual layers, from colonial history to ethnic 
violence, that influenced and motivated neighboring countries and individual actors.   
 Case studies are also necessary when quantitative data is difficult to obtain.  The 
ongoing violence and political upheaval in the DRC make it difficult to acquire 
statistically relevant information.  Moreover, some of the factors that relate to these state-
corporate crimes only exist in qualitative form, and preclude the sue of quantitative 
examinations. 
 Limitations.  One of the most obvious limitations to the case study research 
method is the possible lack of generalizability.  Although this does not occur in all cases, 
it may prove challenging when generalizing an individualized, detailed case study to 
other populations.  In this case study, noting the general events of state-corporate crime 
may allow future occurrences to be recognized before a comparable level of devastation 
occurs.   
Extended Case Method 
 In this study, a secondary analysis of qualitative data collected by an extended 
case method was conducted to adequately apply Model I, the Integrated Theoretical 
Model of State-Corporate Crime, to the DRC conflict.  The extended case method is 
based upon what Burawoy (1998) calls the “reflexive” model of science, which is 
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dependent upon interaction with the subject, rather than positive science’s observation-
based approach that attempts to minimize all contact with, and influencing of, subjects.  
Extended case method “applies reflexive science to ethnography in order to extract the 
general from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro,’ and to connect the 
present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on preexisting theory” 
(Burawoy, 1998, p.5).  Burawoy (1998) notes that positivist-based data collection 
methods, such as surveys, can sometimes violate positive approaches when 
methodological rules are not followed.  Surveys collected in this manner produce 
interview effects, respondent effects, field effects, and situation effects.  Rather than 
continue in the vein of positive science and attempt to minimize these effects, reflexive 
science, and through it the extended case method, embraces these extraneous effects to 
emphasize a dialogue between the researcher and subject.  “The principles of this 
reflexive science can be derived from the context effects that pose as impediments to 
positive science” (Burawoy, 1998, p.14). 
Qualitative Data 
 When examining recent events in an area that has a history of conflict and which 
continues to be engulfed in those conflicts and exhibits various levels of violence, such as 
the DRC and the Ituri region, qualitative methods are one of the only ways to effectively 
collect data.     
 Sources.  This study uses secondary qualitative data analysis and draws heavily 
from the Human Rights Watch (2005) report, “The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic 
of Congo,” and the United Nations (2003) document, “Report of the Panel of Experts on 
the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the 
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Democratic Republic of the Congo.”  Both of these sources largely use qualitative data to 
obtain results.   
The Human Rights Watch (2005) interviewed over 150 individuals in the DRC 
area, including “victims, witnesses, gold miners, gold traders, gold exporters, customs 
officials, OKIMO officials, civil society members and union representatives” (p.7).  
Human Rights Watch interviewers also met with “Ituri armed group leaders, Ugandan 
army officials, DRC and Ugandan government representatives as well as with U.N. 
[United Nations] officials, international diplomats and officials of international financial 
institutions…also engaged in written correspondence with Metalor Technologies and met 
with the company representatives in Switzerland to discuss concerns” (2005, p.7).  These 
interviews occurred over the course of five visits to the DRC and Uganda between 
February and October 2004, and one visit to Europe in January and April 2005.  While in 
the DRC, Human Rights Watch researchers also visited five local gold mines, including 
the mine in Mongbwalu.   
The United Nations (2003) used a variety of sources including primary, 
secondary, and interview sources.  Primary data included official documents from various 
ministries, while secondary sources were reports, and published and unpublished 
literature.  However, the United Nations (2003) states that most data was from countries 
involved in the conflict, including the DRC, Angola, Burundi, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Uganda, Zimbabwe, RCD-Goma, and the Uganda-backed RCD-ML.  Third party sources 
included documents from various countries, United Nations agencies, international 
organizations including the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade 
Organization, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
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Production and export information was also utilized, from the 1995-2000 period, which 
was “systematically analysed [sic] separately and then compared with on another.  
Comparative analysis thus contributed to the Panel’s ability to develop a good 
understanding of the issues” (para. 11).   
 Assessing the models.  In attempts to provide an equivalent presentation of both 
state-corporate crime models, similar data sources were used when applying Model I to 
the DRC conflict.  The Rothe model draws much information from non-governmental 
organizations, including the Human Rights Watch, and international organizations such 
as the United Nations, including the “Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo” (2003).  Mullins and Rothe (2008) use the Human Rights Watch 
document, “Ituri: ‘Covered in Blood’: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR 
Congo” (2003), which used similar methods and information gathered earlier in the 
process of researching the DRC conflict. 
 Advantages.  As Yin (2011) states, “qualitative research offers greater latitude in 
selecting topics of interest because other research methods are likely constrained by…the 
unavailability of sufficient variables…the difficulty in drawing an adequate sample of 
respondents and obtaining a sufficiently high response rate” (p.6).  When studying an 
area with an ineffective government that is embroiled in civil war and victim of human 
rights abuses, response rates reflective of the population would likely be inaccurate.   
 Limitations.  While some research using qualitative data may be generalizable to 
other populations and circumstances, the use of quantitative data in experiments, quasi-
experiments, and surveys can provide specific descriptions of the relationships between 
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particular factors.  In these research designs, specific variables may be tested to 
determine their effect, to measure casual relationships, in ways that are occasionally 
unavailable when using qualitative data.  As Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) note, 
“to our way of thinking, case studies are very relevant when causation is at most a minor 
issue; but in most other cases when substantial uncertainty reduction about causation is 
required, we value qualitative methods within experiments rather than as alternatives to 
them…” (p.501). 
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Chapter Six: Case Study  
 The DRC nationalized the mining sector in 1967, and has since heavily relied on 
it for income (Kennes, 2005).  During the First Congo War, when he led a rebel-
controlled portion of the country, Kabila was able to secure mining investments from 
international corporations (United Nations, 2003) including De Beers and the Anglo-
American Corporation, of which AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. was once a subsidiary (Anglo 
American, 2009; AngloGold Ashanti, 2007; Renner, 2002).   
Securing the aforementioned mining investments was the beginning of 
questionable practices in the mining sector under Kabila’s regime.  Little or no oversight 
protected the DRC’s resources from being mined by corporations cooperating with 
militia demands.  Later, these militias would use the received monetary demands to fund 
their continued human rights abuses.  I will be reviewing relationships between the DRC 
government, international corporations such as AngloGold Ashanti, and regional militias 
including FNI, and their intertwined roles in committing state-corporate crime.  To 
provide a clear picture of the differences between the Integrated Theoretical Model of 
State-Corporate Crime (Model I) and the Integrated Theory of International Criminal 
Law Violations (Model II) at each level within both models I apply the appropriate 
catalysts of action to the DRC conflict. 
An Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime (Model I) 
As noted previously, state-corporate crime research has explored a number of 
specific instances of state-corporate crime.  The present study applies this approach to the 
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DRC.  The Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime by Kramer, 
Michalowski, and Kauzlarich (or the KMK model) has not yet been applied to a case 
study of the DRC.  To do so, I review the DRC case using the theoretical components of 
the KMK model reviewed earlier.  At the institutional environment level, it can be 
illustrated that the DRC’s weak political and economic institutions enabled resource 
exploitation by Rwanda and Uganda.  At the organizational level, the DRC allowed 
corporations to access mineral concessions in war torn regions where known human 
rights abuses were occurring.  AngloGold Ashanti was one of the most documented 
companies involved in these activities.  At the interaction level, local militia received 
various forms of bribes from AngloGold Ashanti, and its members likely furthered the 
state-corporate crime as a result of socialization and desire to reach material goals. 
Institutional environment (I.1).  At the institutional environment level, state-
corporate crime examines social institutions through political economic theory, which 
suggests that capitalism drives the perpetration of state-corporate crime.  During the 
study period, the DRC faced a history of colonialism and war, a wartime economy, and 
extreme ethnic conflict within the DRC and neighboring countries, including the 
genocide in Rwanda.  Additionally, the mining sector was uncontrolled under Kabila’s 
regime, which would allow for rampant corruption in the mining sector that benefitted 
regional militias and foreign militaries.  Politically and economically the DRC was 
unstable and volatile (Prunier, 2009).   
A serious problem related to monopolization of mining and the control of mining 
by colonial mining companies existed.  Attempts to address colonial monopolization led 
the government to award mining concessions to a number of smaller, unreliable 
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companies.  One consequence of this solution was the withdrawal of larger companies 
from the DRC mining sector (Kennes, 2005).  In search of revenue, the Zimbabwean 
military was granted a diamond concession.  To effectively control their concession, 
military control was established to maintain their presence in the mining sector (Kennes, 
2005).   
While Kabila was fighting to end riots protesting his regime during the second 
war, Rwandan and Ugandan forces also conducted widespread looting of the DRC’s 
mineral resources and redirected those resources into their national exports of raw 
materials.  Rwanda and Uganda both exported gold and diamond resources in excess of 
their productive capacity, which indicated that there were additional sources for those 
exports (Renner, 2002).  In investigating this issue, the United Nations (2003) reported 
that:  
The Central Bank of Uganda has reportedly acknowledged to IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] officials that the volume of Ugandan gold exports does not 
reflect this country’s production levels, but rather that some exports might be 
“leaking over the borders” from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The 
central bank reported that, by September 1997, Uganda had exported gold valued 
at $105 million, compared with $60 million in 1996 and $23 million in 1995.   
(para. 98)  
Additionally, the United Nations (2003) found that while Uganda has exported diamonds 
from 2000 to 2003, the country does not have diamond production capabilities.  
Similarly, the same report notes that Rwanda has exported diamonds without diamond 
production.  This pillaging of mining fields by corporations and neighboring countries 
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only fed the violence as the funds received by Kabila’s government and rebel forces were 
used to supply weapons and perpetuate the conflict (Renner, 2002; Ezekiel, 2007). 
The previously mentioned instances indicate that the DRC government possessed 
little control over the mineral sector, as they were unable to prevent or halt the looting of 
resources by the Ugandan and Rwandan militaries.   The Ugandan and Rwandan 
governments acquired mineral resources through illegal means with little intervention by 
the DRC government.  The DRC government also facilitated state-corporate crime when 
it contributed to undermining the mineral sector in poor attempts to prevent 
monopolization by signing dubious contracts with smaller companies, eventually failing 
to prevent the involvement of corporations in militia activity.   
Motivation (I.1.A).  At this level, catalysts for action present themselves as 
motivation, in the form of economic need and greed of the DRC and its neighboring 
countries.  The DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda faced a number of economic pressures related 
to fighting in the DRC conflict.  The Second Congo War created increased external debt 
for the DRC, as military expenses increased while national outputs and government 
revenue declined (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013).  In the DRC this economic 
pressure was reflected in the weak and disorganized contract standards that allowed the 
questionable concession of resource grants to various companies.  The DRC depended 
upon these mineral resources to fund the Second Congo War (United Nations, 2003), 
which provides ample motivation to grant questionable mineral concessions.  The DRC 
government’s inability to monitor and control its recourses is further exemplified as 
Rwanda and Uganda illegally transported gold resources into their respective countries to 
later be sold as exports, using the revenues to support their militaries (United Nations, 
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2003), eventually resulting in an estimated $60 million in gold being looted by Uganda 
by 2003 to then be sold as Ugandan exports (Human Rights Watch, 2005).  
Opportunity structure (I.1.B).  As mentioned when detailing this catalyst for 
action in Chapter Four, opportunity structure includes the availability of illegal methods 
and blocked goals or strain, indicative of anomie.  The poor government oversight of the 
mining sector and inability for the government to effectively control the geographic 
region of the northeast, in addition to the heavy concentration of mineral resources in the 
DRC are all factors that allowed the government, particularly the state-run Office of the 
Gold Mines of Kilo-Moto (OKIMO), to facilitate state-corporate crime.  Because 
Kabila’s regime was unable to exert control over the mining sector, few repercussions 
existed for illegal mining operations the government was facilitating.   
Operationality of control (I.1.C).  Operationality of control is reflected in the lax 
intervention by outside agencies designed to end resource exploitation and human rights 
abuses, and lack of global awareness of these problems during the time of occurrence.  
The United Nations investigated the resource exploitation that had occurred in the DRC 
and published its findings (United Nations, 2003).  However, while the United Nations, 
along with several other counties “acknowledged that resource exploitation played a role 
in exacerbating and prolonging the conflict in the DRC…few efforts were made to deal 
with the issue” (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 118).  In this way, the failure of existing 
international control structures to respond to the situation in DRC perpetuated the forms 
of state-corporate crime that were occurring there. 
Organizational level (I.2).  At this level, organizational theory is used to identify 
and explain organizational perpetrators of state-corporate crime.  Previous use of 
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organizational theory looks to anomie.  As corporations are in pursuit of organizational 
goals, they may be inclined to use illegal means when they are available.  Throughout the 
DRC conflict, various state actors interacted with organizations to achieve illegally 
gained goals.  Prior to 2003, several transportation companies were also involved with 
the smuggling of resources from the DRC to Uganda or Rwanda, including Sabena 
Cargo, which reportedly transported illegal coltan from the DRC to Europe (United 
Nations, 2003).  Coltan is a mineral employed in the construction of portable electronic 
devices that is largely found in the DRC (Global Witness, 2009).  The demand and price 
of colton peaked in 2000, two years after the Second Congo War began, but it 
subsequently dropped a year later.  In 2007, 428.4 tons of colton were exported, from 
which 116 tons of tantalum could have been extracted, competitive with other countries 
that produce it.  Brazil, a top producer of tantalum, produced 180 tons in 2007 (as cited in 
Global Witness, 2009, p. 20).  
When the transitional government was installed in 2003, interest in mining 
concessions was sparked again.  Several corporations sought a particularly large 
concession in northeast DRC.  These corporations appear to have little concern that the 
transitional government had little to no control over the Ituri region, as contracts were 
signed by the state gold company, OKIMO.  By September 2004, eleven companies were 
granted mining concessions in northeastern Congo (Human Rights Watch, 2005).  The 
apparent lack of concern these corporations had regarding the level of governmental 
control in the region reflects organizational anomie, as these corporations pursued 
organizational goals to reach economic success by disregarding ongoing regional 
violence.  In an act of negligence, the DRC government again facilitated faulty practices 
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in the mining sector for their own economic gain.  These actions in themselves are not 
acts of state-corporate crime, but would lead to AngloGold Ashanti’s dubious practices 
that would perpetuate state-corporate crime in the DRC.  
AngloGold Ashanti began exploration activities in Mongbwalu, while the 
Ugandan army and FNI held areas outside of the town.  The FNI employed tactic that led 
to severe and ongoing human rights abuses perpetuated in the area to facilitate mining.  
By 2003, the mines in the Ituri region, now owned by AngloGold Ashanti, were in 
control of the FNI.  It was at the suggestion of the DRC transitional government’s vice 
president of economy and finance, Jean-Pierre Bemba, that AngloGold Ashanti enter an 
arrangement with FNI  (Human Rights Watch, 2005).  Entering into a relationship with 
FNI, AngloGold Ashanti violated international conventions that were established to 
protect human rights such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Fundamental Rights Convention of the International Labour Organization, and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develeopment (OECD) (Human Rights 
Watch, 2005). 
Motivation (I.2.A).  The motivational catalyst involves business goals related to 
profit making.  For capitalist driven corporations, a pervasive desire to increase profits is 
incorporated into business goals and corporate culture.  Given the conditions in the DRC, 
corporations attempted to capitalize on the DRC’s increasingly privatized mining 
industry, or were disinclined to leave preexisting mining operations due to profitability 
(Nest, 2006).   The financial gain that mining operations would net provides ample 
motivation for corporations to seek illegal mining opportunities.  Corporate culture values 
likely further emphasized the benefits of illegal acts for the smuggling of resources by 
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various companies.  As Human Rights Watch (2005) detailed, “The FNI armed group 
was also approached by multinational companies eager to gain access to the significant 
gold reserves in the area.  The FNI Commissioner of Mines explained to Human Rights 
Watch that they had been approached by a number of different companies but that 
officially AngloGold Ashanti had the concession in the Mongbwalu area and that they 
were in contact with them” (p.57).  In this way, the interests of corporations in profits and 
the interests of the DRC aligned, creating conditions for state-corporate crime to emerge.  
The DRC government, weak and ineffective as displayed by the ongoing looting by 
Rwandan and Ugandan militaries, facilitated state-corporate crime by promoting 
questionable contracts in the mining sector.  These contracts included land in the 
violently unstable, militia held Ituri region.  Corporations, particularly AngloGold 
Ashanti, entered the state-corporate crime by actively pursing their contracted mineral 
resources, which led them to enter an illegal business partnership with FNI, a militia that 
was actively committing human rights abuses.  This partnership violated several 
international standards by non-governmental agencies including principles of the United 
Nations Global Compact (Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
Opportunity structure (I.2.B).  Opportunity structure at this level may include the 
extent of violence and plundering of mineral sources.  Under prevailing conditions, these 
opportunities also created a normalization of deviance.  This normalization of deviance 
would largely be a result of the extremely violent acts committed by FNI that became 
commonplace, and corporate mining practices that included “...offering monopolies in 
exchange for kickbacks, embezzling money from state-run companies, creating joint 
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ventures in which politicians were shareholders, and accepting unfavorable contract 
terms for the state in exchange for kickbacks” (as cited in Chêne, 2010, p. 3).   
 Illegal means were further created as AngloGold Ashanti “delivered material 
benefits and prestige to the FNI” (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p.65).  Benefits provided 
to FNI entailed monetary payments.  Human Rights Watch (2005) found AngloGold 
Ashanti was paying FNI leader Floribert Njabu. One source stated that AngloGold 
Ashanti was giving Njabu a few hundred dollars to “feel included,” while another source 
agreed payments were being made to FNI, but payments were higher than a few hundred 
dollars (p. 72).  FNI also controlled the local airport, where it charged AngloGold “six 
US cents per kilogram of cargo,” although AngloGold Ashanti stated that in September 
2004 it desisted what was a “‘common practice’…when it came to the attention of 
company officials in Kinshasa and in light of ‘the fact that it contravened the provisions 
of the U.N. resolution…’” (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 73).  However, a year earlier 
AngloGold Ashanti denied its involvement when the United Nations included the 
company in its report on exploitation of natural resources in the DRC.  This discrepancy 
may indicate a breakdown in the corporation’s communication process, which is a factor 
of the organizational level’s opportunity structure.  Interacting with the FNI in such a 
way may have violated the United Nations arms embargo placed on the Northeastern 
region of the DRC in 2003 that prohibited any “…direct or indirect assistance, especially 
military or financial assistance…given to the movements and armed groups present in the 
DRC...” (as cited in Human Rights Watch, 2005, p.67). 
Operationality of control (I.2.C).  The culture of compliance and reward structure 
are likely the two factors most responsible for the operationality of control at this level.  
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AngloGold Ashanti clearly had interest in protecting their operations in Mongbwalu.  
Prior to the end of the war in the Ituri region, a representative from Ashanti Goldfields, 
the predecessor of AngloGold Ashanti, was sent to “assess the situation,” and 
subsequently met with the UPC, the militia controlling Mongbwalu before FNI, to 
discuss mining ventures (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 65).  The UPC leader, interested 
in contracting the mine to Ashanti Goldfields after UPC controlled Mongbwalu, 
contacted OKIMO to make the necessary arrangements.  Eventually, FNI would take 
control of Mongbwalu; however the collaboration of the state controlled OKIMO, 
corporation Ashanti Goldfields, and militia UPC demonstrates the relationships between 
actors in this instance of state-corporate crime.  In 2003, the Ituri Interim Assembly 
referred to the dangerous situation in Mongbwalu, where the FNI was continuing human 
rights abuses, when meeting with AngloGold Ashanti’s office representative for Uganda 
and the DRC, the project manager for Mongbwalu, and an AngloGold Ashanti 
consultant.  Amidst these safety concerns, company officials visited Mongbwalu months 
later with FNI members (Human Rights Watch, 2005).  These repeated meetings and 
visitations with the FNI militia resulted in what appears to be a business partnership, as 
FNI allowed for AngloGold Ashanti employees to conduct business at their mineral 
concession in Mongbwalu, while Anglogold Ashanti subsequently provided monetary 
payments to FNI and Njabu.  These payments likely secured AngloGold Ashanti with 
access to their mining production, facilitating state-corporate crime as AngloGold 
Ashanti not break the United Nations embargo, but also indirectly funding FNI’s 
ethnically motivated human rights abuses, including the brutal torture and murder of its 
opponents.  The repeated meetings indicate a culture of compliance as representatives 
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and heads of office from the region were aware of safety concerns and FNI activity in the 
Mongbwalu area where the concession was located, and employees did not raise 
concerns.  This culture of compliance, where employees and supervisors were aware of 
but did not report possible illegitimate activities, displays an accommodation for illegal 
means if it results in beneficial corporate outcomes, or reaches profitable goals. 
Interaction level (I.3).  AngloGold Ashanti began exploration activities in 
Mongbwalu, while the Ugandan army and FNI held areas outside of the town.  Presence 
of the FNI was noted by severe and ongoing human rights abuses perpetuated in the area.  
By 2003, the mines in the Ituri region, now owned by AngloGold Ashanti, were in 
control of the FNI.   
At the interaction level, individual actions and socialization is reflected in the 
dealings of company representatives with FNI president, Floribert Njabu.  Between 2003 
and 2005, AngloGold Ashanti entered into a relationship with FNI in which AngloGold 
Ashanti provided FNI with bribes in return for access to the gold mines.  Reportedly, 
monetary payments and transportation using AngloGold Ashanti company vehicles and 
hired planes were provided for FNL use (Human Rights Watch, 2005).  At this time the 
FNI continued human rights abuses, including massacres of the Hema ethnic minority, 
forced labor, and torture; all of which could have been furthered by materials supplied by 
AngloGold Ashanti.  By dealing with the FNI, AngloGold Ashanti may have also 
violated the 2003 UN arms embargo on eastern DRC (Human Rights Watch, 2005).   
Motivation (I.3.A).  AngloGold Ashanti’s bribery reflects FNI’s motivation for 
material success.  Additionally, the Ituri region was suffering from severe human rights 
abuses, and individual members of the militia likely experienced the effect of differential 
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association that furthered criminogenic actions and assisted in the perpetration of state-
corporate crimes.   
Opportunity structure (I.3.B).  Opportunity structure at this level involves the 
prevalence of criminal activity in the region, as the FNI and AngloGold Ashanti, and 
likely other corporations, view illegal options as viable and attractive choices.  The war-
torn region of northeastern DRC would also contribute to the perception of available 
illegal means, with little government enforcement preventing local abuses. 
Operationality of control (I.3.C).  Operationality of control includes the, 
“personal morality, rationalization and techniques of neutralization, separation from 
consequences, obedience to authority, group think, and diffusion of responsibility” 
(Kramer et al., 2002), all of which were likely to have occurred within both parties, FNI 
and AngloGold Ashanti, as a result of the surrounding violence in the Ituri region. 
Summary.  This model examined the actions of the DRC government, 
AngloGold Ashanti, and militia group FNI.  The DRC, in seeking economic support to 
recover from the costly war, facilitated state-corporate crime through negligence and 
ineffective control of the mining sector and northeastern region of the country.  As a 
corporation that sought financial gains to achieve business goals in a uncontrolled and 
violent environment, AngloGold Ashanti furthered the state-corporate crime by pursuing 
their mining contract and providing benefits for FNI, a militia that continued to commit 
abhorrent human rights abuses.   
In the following section, I will examine an alternative explanation for state-
corporate crime in the DRC, by referring to Mullins and Rothe (2008) and their use of the 
Integrated Theory of International Criminal Law.  To assess both models on an 
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equivalent level, sources used in the application of Model I were comparable to those 
used by Mullins and Rothe (2008). 
A Comparative Look at the Integrated Theory of International Criminal Law 
Violations (Model II) 
 In “Gold, Diamonds and Blood: International State-Corporate Crime in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Mullins and Rothe (2008) apply the Rothe model to 
the DRC conflict.  At the international level, actions by Rwanda and Uganda and 
inactions by the United Nations are detailed.  The macro level reviews the DRC’s 
government and economic structure, while the meso level looks at the local actions of the 
corporations and militias.  The micro level expresses the involvement of military leaders 
and militia members in this state-corporate crime.   
International level (II.1).  At the international level, Mullins & Rothe (2008) 
identified the DRC’s neighboring countries, Rwanda and Uganda, and several 
international corporations as influential actors that assisted in the perpetuation of state-
corporate crime in the DRC, as they failed to follow international standards.  Unless trade 
negotiations occurred, which they did not, then “involvement in this sort of trade violates 
human rights laws when the nature of mining and export operations fails to follow 
existing international guidelines” (Mullins & Rothe, 2008).  Additionally, the United 
Nations Security Council enabled international actors to participate in this occurrence of 
state-corporate crime by fostering an environment lacking controls. 
Motivation (II.1.A).  While the DRC was facing widespread social unrest, 
Rwanda and Uganda began exporting mineral resources illegally obtained from the DRC.  
Both countries were financially motivated, using revenue from these exports to fund their 
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militaries. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank also granted Rwanda and 
Uganda increased financial status and economic health indicators, and the credit line of 
both countries was raised (Mullins & Rothe, 2008).  
Opportunity (II.1.B).  Regionally, the DRC’s political and social upheaval 
allowed Rwanda and Uganda to easily obtain the mineral resources they illegally claimed 
as their own.  As Mullins and Rothe (2008) note, “the WB [World Bank] knew exactly 
where those additional monies were coming from.  This is not the first time that the 
criminogenic influences of international financial policies have been noted…nor is it the 
first time that the WB has ignored criminal sources of monies (during the 1980s it 
ignored Cambodia’s illegal exploitation of its neighbours’ timber resources)” (p.94).  
This indicates that within the opportunities at this level, the state of international relations 
was lax enough to allow for the perpetration of dramatic looting of mineral resources 
with little consequence.  
Constraints (II.1.C).  Constraints at this level include international reaction and 
political pressure, both of which were largely absent from this state-corporate crime.  
Mullins and Rothe (2008) cite the lack of involvement by the United Nation’s Security 
Council in Africa since the 1990s.  With previous mission failings in the 1960s, followed 
by the advent of the Cold War, Western nations in the Security Council sought 
independent approaches for Africa (Mullins & Rothe, 2008).  This created a lack of 
appropriate action by international powers during the DRC conflict, and subsequently 
little media coverage that could have sparked public interest and social movements. 
Controls (II.1.D).  Mullins and Rothe (2008) refer to a general lack of constraints 
in this case, as internal laws were not applied, and sanctions did not occur.  The only 
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constraint would be the chance to prosecute the responsible parties after the crime 
occurred through the “Security Council creating an international criminal tribunal” (p. 
95), which did not deter local warlords.   
Macro level (II.2).  At the macro level, Mullins and Rothe (2008) emphasize the 
weak governmental and economic structure of the DRC, which was a result of 
postcolonial societal changes.  Like other postcolonial countries, after DRC gained 
independence from Belgium they had to rebuild social institutions with little guidance.  
As Mullins and Rothe (2008) note, many of these countries rebuild institutions in 
reflection of previous colonial institutions while lacking the “historical-cultural tradition 
of such forms of governance” (p.  95), or traditional knowledge and experience of 
forming and participating in these forms governments and economies. 
Motivation (II.2.A).  Many of the motivating factors driving the DRC’s national 
government to undertake state-corporate crime are the result of Belgium’s departure 
during the decolonization process.  As with many other African nations during the 
postcolonial era, the DRC had to rebuild basic economic and political institutions with 
little prior experience to guide them.  The political instability and economic confusion 
presented international corporations with a prime opportunity to establish a means for 
personal gain (Mullins & Rothe, 2008).  These structural transformations occur in 
conjunction with societal anomie that takes place when former colonies gain 
independence.  Ethnogenesis in the DRC is also reflected as differing ethnic groups were 
forced together by political boundaries, occasionally resulting in conflict. 
Opportunity (II.2.B).  The Rothe model expresses opportunity at the macro level 
as including the availability of illegal means and military capabilities.  As a postcolonial 
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nation, the DRC faced disorganized economic and political situations and “…the 
amplified nature of these forces within postcolonial nations produces a similarly 
amplified criminogenic push” (Mullins& Rothe, 2008).  This social disorganization 
providing an opportunity for crime is most exampled by the little governmental control 
exerted on the mining sector, including the actions of Kabila himself.  Often, to 
accommodate his changing interests, Kabila would renegotiate mining contracts, which 
would lead to confusion among the companies.  AngloGold Ashanti even lost its mining 
concession contract in 1997, until it regained the rights a year later (Human Rights 
Watch, 2005).  
Constraints (II.2.C).  Constraints at this level typically include political pressure, 
media scrutiny, and social pressures that manifest through public opinion, social 
movements and rebellion.  In the DRC case study, such constraints include local fighting 
between Hema and Lendu ethnic groups that occurred to determine control of the mineral 
resources.  There are few constraints presented by Mullins and Rothe (2008) that took 
place in the DRC, as local media attention supported the ongoing violence and 
international media provided very little coverage of the DRC conflict 
Controls (II.2.D).  Legal sanctions and domestic law provided little assistance in 
preventing this occurrence of state-corporate crime.  The DRC’s federal government had 
jurisdiction of militia dominated areas in name only, and therefore was unable to 
effectively enforce the law, let alone impose sanctions on militia members.  Additionally, 
social institutions also faced few controls that would have prevented illegal acts.   
Meso level (II.3).  The meso level of the Rothe Model in the DRC case study 
focuses on the actions of the militias and local branches of the corporations involved in 
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illegal means of acquiring mineral resources.  The FNI is the primary actor at this level, 
in addition to the local company representatives that worked alongside FNI in 
Mongbwalu.  This is best illustrated by FNI’s allowance for mining activities to be 
conducted by AngloGold Ashanti, while the AngloGold provided monetary payments to 
satisfy FNI (Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
Motivation (II.3.A).  Ultimately, corporations are seeking profits, a goal which is 
the result of “cultures of corporate accumulation” (Mullins & Rothe, 2008, p.96).  While 
corporations desire profit, militias are largely driven by “strong ethnic biases that form 
the core of membership identities within these groups” (Mullins & Rothe, 2008, p.96).  
These ethnic biases were the primary motivation for FNI’s formation, as the Lendu group 
targeted Hema individuals in their perpetration of human rights abuses and massacres 
(Human Rights Wathc, 2005). 
Opportunity (II.3.B).  Opportunities for illegal acts arise when little 
communication occurs between the subunit and the corporation.  As previously 
mentioned in Model I’s organizational level (I.2.B),  Human Rights Watch (2005) found 
that a year after payments had been made to FNI, AngloGold Ashanti denied involvement 
in mineral resources exploitation as alleged by the United Nations.  Additionally, when 
company representatives in the DRC capital Kinshasa discovered a cargo tax was being 
paid to FNI, they acknowledged it as illegal and subsequently ended payments.  Both of 
these occurrences indicate a breakdown in communications at various levels between 
upper and middle management and company representatives on site in Mongbwalu.   
Mullins and Rothe (2008) simply identify the strong likelihood of the development of 
criminal cultures as criminal values are reinforced.  Corporations may also be provided 
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the opportunity to use illegal means to acquire resources as a result of uncontrolled 
resource transfers, and freeports used in international trade agreements. 
Constraints (II.3.C).  Within their research on the DRC and state-corporate 
crime, Mullins and Rothe (2008) do not identify particular constraints.  The Rothe model, 
though, also views communication structure as an opportunity and possible control or 
constraint, in addition to internal oversight and authority structures.  As earlier 
mentioned, the lack of effective communication between AngloGold Ashanti’s 
representatives on site Mongbwalu, those in Kinshasa and regional locations, and the 
corporate headquarters was evidenced by various statements that state involvement in 
financial contributions to FNI that it desisted, followed by a statement denying 
participation.  
Controls (II.3.D).  Codes of conduct provide the only source of control at the 
meso level, and are likely close to nonexistent for many militias.  Corporations may have 
internally established codes of conduct, however if there is a breakdown in 
communication then enforcement of these codes may be minimal.  In this case, one of the 
most evident sources of codes of conduct would be international regulation of trade as 
detailed in the previous model.  The United Nations embargo, for example, prohibited 
working with or providing assistance to militia groups in the northeastern region of the 
DRC.  However, subsequent sanctions were not provided, allowing corporations such as 
AngloGold Ashanti to continue unimpeded.  Mullins and Rothe (2008) do not refer to 
meso level controls for the DRC case study.   
Micro level (II.4).  Mullins and Rothe (2008) identify military leaders and militia 
members perpetuating the state-corporate crime at this level within the DRC case.   
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Njabu, as the leader of FNI, directly received payment from AngloGold Ashanti, as 
mentioned in the previous model, in addition to leading the militia in conducting human 
rights abuses against the Hema population in Mongbwalu and its surrounding areas.    
Motivation (II.3.A).  At the micro level, individual goals are personal gain and 
empowerment.  Njabu received power as he led the FNI and controlled the FNI-ruled 
town of Mongbwalu, and was given financial compensation by AngloGold Ashanti.  
Community disorganization results in men who have little or no other 
opportunities for financial gain may turn to the militia for employment.  Within the 
militia, ethnic bias further motivates members (Mullins & Rothe, 2008).   
Opportunity (II.4.B).  In this case study, opportunities at the micro level are not 
detailed by Mullins and Rothe (2008), but in the Rothe model do include “an obedience 
to authority, group think, diffusion of responsibility, and perceived illegal means” (Rothe, 
2009, p.102).  As the FNI militia was effectively controlling the local area, government 
intervention did not reach into the Ituri region and therefore FNI did not face government 
sactions for its human rights abuses and bribery-based relationship with AngoGold 
Ashanti.  Without an outside influence impeding FNI’s violence, FNI was the local law 
which would have prevented many militia members from perceiving their actions as 
illegal. 
Constraints (II.4.C).  Mullins and Rothe (2008) do not refer to clear constraints; 
however, they do state, “…militias become the only stable and empowered social 
grouping in a community” (p. 97).  This implies effective individual constraints may only 
come from within the militia.  Within the model, constraints at this level include personal 
morality, which cannot be effectively measured with the given sources, and 
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“socialization, obedience to authority, and informal social controls” (Rothe, 2009, p.102).  
These constraints were probably not enforced at this level, as the militia was the authority 
figure in Mongbwalu.  As the violence spread individuals were likely socialized to act 
violently as well.   
For individuals in the government that allowed lax regulation and questionable 
practices to occur in the mining sector, there was also little authoritative presence to obey 
that condoned legal actions.  The corruption was prevalent in all levels of the 
government, including the presidential office as Kabila frequently renegotiated contracts, 
promoting confusion and uncertainty for companies in the mining sector. 
Controls (II.4.D).  According to Mullins and Rothe (2008), the micro level 
controls are legitimacy of law and the perception of the reality of law’s application.  
Mullins and Rothe (2008) suggest that the International Criminal Court could prosecute 
individuals involved in transnational crimes, with a certainty that does not exist when 
specialized courts are utilized.  Additionally, at the micro level the individuals both 
within the militias, military, and corporations most likely did not perceive the threat of 
legal sanctions as a legitimate cause for concern.  The DRC’s social institutions were 
unstable and unable to govern areas of the country, creating a reality where enforcement 
of the law was minimal to non-existent.  
Summary and Conclusion 
When comparing the application of the Integrated Theoretical Model of State-
Corporate Crime (Model I) of the DRC conflict to the Rothe model (Model II), few 
differences exist.  Model I identifies the weak government of the DRC, and its desire for 
increased financing, as perpetrators at the institutional environment level.  The fragile 
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government structure and economy are reflected by the exploitative actions of Uganda 
and Rwanda.  At the organizational level, corporations such as AngloGold Ashanti are 
driven by profit and poor governmental enforcement to pursue mining of the Mongbwalu 
mines, disregarding FNI’s human rights abuses.  At the interaction level, local FNI 
leaders and milita members are responsible for perpetrating human rights abuses, while 
accepting bribes from AngloGold Ashanti.  Accepting these bribes furthers the state-
corporate crime.   
Model II declares Uganda and Rwanda as perpetrators at the international level, 
while the DRC government is responsible at the macro level.  The meso level identifies 
local militias and corporations, while military leaders and militia members are examined 
at the micro level. 
The glaring differences between the models are the addition of an international 
level and the measure of constraints.  However, Model I provides an explanation of 
international influences at the institutional environment level without adding another 
level of examination.  Likewise, constraints and controls in Model II are incorporated 
into one category of operationality of control in Model I.  In application, the actions of 
Uganda and Rwanda reflect the DRC’s weak social institutions, while the inactions of 
international bodies enabled the state-corporate crimes to progress.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 The DRC has faced years of political upheaval, internal and external violence, and 
exploitation.  Through the actions of its own government, neighboring countries, and 
international corporations, the DRC has become a web of state-corporate crime.  Using 
Model I, the Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime, as theorized by 
Kramer and Michalowski (1990) and revised by Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998), to 
explain the state-corporate crime in the DRC provides a more parsimonious theoretical 
explanation than the use of Model II by Mullins and Rothe (2008).  While the interest in 
and use of theory in the field of state-corporate crime is applauded, Model II, the 
Integrated Theory of International Criminal Law Violations, creates an overreaching 
version of Model I.  The parsimonious results of Model I potentially allow for additional 
application of theory to explain future occurrences of state-corporate and allow 
criminologists to address past conflicts and to prevent future abuses.   
Corruption in the DRC 
 The DRC continues to face many obstacles before achieving a more stable social 
and economic environment.  Joseph Kabila took power in 2001 after his father was 
assassinated.  In 2006, previously banned multiparty elections were held, in which Joseph 
Kabila was elected into office.  While the war has ended, violent outbreaks and 
corruption has continued.  Corruption within all levels of the DRC government initially 
enabled state-corporate crime to take root in the country.  As Chêne (2010) states, 
67 
“…country reports indicate persistent, widespread and endemic forms of corruption in the 
DRC, permeating all levels of society” (p. 2).  
 However, Kabila has continued to address the issue since taking office.  In 2005, 
the DRC enacted an anti-corruption law that included terms of the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption and African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption (as cited in Chêne, 2010).  Although this law addresses the 
extensive corruption, many government officials continue to overlook corrupt practices.  
In 2009, Kabila approached corruption with a “zero-tolerance” campaign, which entailed 
the creation of the DRC Financial Intelligence Unit to “combat money laundering and 
misappropriation of public funds” (Chêne, 2010, p. 6).   
To continue earnestly fight corruption, the DRC population must be informed of 
basic legalities.  Accountability is poor and exacerbated by the population’s legal 
unawareness.  As Chêne (2010) cites, “.... information dissemination is poorly developed, 
and many citizens don’t know the laws and regulations that affect their lives and remain 
largely unaware of their rights and obligations” (p.6). 
Implications and Limitations 
 Results of this case study suggest that while Model II provides an admirable effort 
to explain state-corporate crime, the expansion of the previously suitable Model I was 
unnecessary.  Due to its integrative nature, Model I already presents a complex approach 
to explain the multiple levels involved in state-corporate crime.   
 A few factors limited this study, including the lack of methodological explanation 
in state-corporate crime case studies, and minimal theoretical application when 
presenting case studies on state-corporate crime.  Case studies are commonly used as the 
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research method used to review state-corporate crime.  However, most state-corporate 
crime research does not detail the author’s use of the case study methodology.  
Additionally, this study was hampered by the little research criminologists have 
previously conducted in creating and applying theory aimed at specifically explaining 
state-corporate crime.  
Directions for Future Research 
 Criminological research would benefit from continued study of the DRC conflict. 
The unfortunate abundance of illegal acts, including human rights abuses and state-
corporate crime, should be addressed within the context of colonization and subsequent 
decolonization.  The criminogenic environment, as evidenced by Model I and Model II, is 
contextually rooted in the effects of colonization.  In this case study, the artificial 
boundaries created by Leopold II when establishing his colony, followed by the harsh 
laws in northeastern DRC, exacerbated pre-existing ethnic conflict.  In addition to the 
abrupt decolonization process that poorly prepared the DRC for independence, it is little 
wonder that the regional environment produced such extreme criminogenic actions.  In 
depth research on the effects of colonization and delonization on countries that produce 
state crime has yet to be conducted, and would benefit theoretical and practical 
applications of criminology. 
 Further research must be conducted on state-corporate crimes.  As the field of 
criminology expands, so must research on state-corporate crime and its perpetration by 
actors at every level of the crime.  Not only do cases of state-corporate crime contribute 
to theoretical understanding in criminology, but the increased understanding of why these 
crimes occur may allow researchers to promote actions that may limit the scale of future 
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occurrences.  Instances of large-scale crimes like state-corporate crime affect many 
people.  Unfortunately, current focus on state-corporate crime does not reflect the 
proportionality of victims in each state-corporate crime offense.  There are a number of 
unexplored opportunities in criminological research to address the inadequate focus on 
state-corporate crime, and criminologists must continue to bring to light these crimes.  
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